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The post-1945 legal order, whatever its deficiencies, has been associated with a certain sta-
bility in the relations among states. Under that legal order, constraints have limited territorial
claims and the methods by which states pursue them. International law and its institutions do
not provide support for the separation of Crimea from Ukraine or its annexation to Russia.
Whether the international legal orderwill prove over time to operate as a constraint on the con-
solidation or durability of these acts remains to be tested.
THE CHAPEAU OF THEGENERAL EXCEPTIONS IN THEWTOGATT AND
GATS AGREEMENTS: A RECONSTRUCTION
By Lorand Bartels*
One of the most important issues in the law of the World Trade Organization is the right
of WTO members to adopt measures for nontrade purposes. In the WTO’s General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), this right is secured in general exceptions provisions,1 which permitWTOmembers
to adopt measures to achieve certain objectives, notwithstanding any other provisions of these
agreements and also, in some cases, otherWTO agreements.2 These objectives include, most
importantly, the protection of publicmorals, themaintenance of public order,3 the protection
of human, animal, or plant life or health, the enforcement of certain domestic laws, and the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.4
The right to adopt measures for these purposes is subject to various conditions, some of
which are specific to the objective at issue. For example, a measure for conserving exhaustible
natural resources needs to “relate to” that objective and be “made effective in conjunctionwith
domestic restrictions on production or consumption of those resources,”5 whereas a measure
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welyn, JuliaQin, Frieder Roessler,MarieWilke,Michelle Zhang, and the editors for their useful comments. Opin-
ions and errors remain my own.
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter GATT 1994], Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS
187; General Agreement on Trade in Services, Art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994,WTOAgreement, supra, Annex 1B, 1869
UNTS 183 [hereinafter GATS]. WTO legal texts are available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
legal_e.htm and reprinted in The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(Cambridge University Press, 1999).
2 The general exceptions also apply to obligations in related WTO agreements, sometimes expressly, as in the
Agreement on Trade-Related InvestmentMeasures, Art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994,WTOAgreement, supra note 1, Annex
1A, 1868 UNTS 186, and the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, Art. 24(7), WTO Doc. WT/L/931 ( July 15,
2014) (not yet in force), and sometimes by implication, as in relation to certain obligations in accession protocols.
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trade Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, para. 415, WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010).
Documents for WTO disputes are available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.
htm#disputes.
3 This exception is not included in GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. XX.
4 This last exception is not included in GATS, supra note 1, Art. XIV.
5 GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. XX(g).
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for protecting public morals must be “necessary” to that objective.6 In addition—and this is
the topic of this article—the right to adopt these measures is subject, in bothGATT 1994 and
GATS, to a set of conditions in an introductory paragraph to their general exceptions provi-
sions, known as the “chapeau.” The chapeau provides that a measure that is adopted for one
of the legitimate objectives listed in the subparagraphs of these provisions not be “applied in
amanner which would constitute ameans of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.”7
The conditions in the chapeau have proved decisive in a number of disputes in which the
measures at issue, though adopted for legitimate reasons by the respondent WTOmembers,
were found to discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably, or both, against the products or services
of the complainant WTO members. For example, in U.S.—Gasoline, the United States was
permitted to impose certain standards on gasoline in order to protect clean air, but it had done
so in a manner that discriminated unjustifiably against Venezuelan gasoline.8 In U.S.—
Shrimp, theUnited States was entitled to prohibit imports of shrimp so as to protect sea turtles,
but it had done so in a manner that discriminated arbitrarily and unjustifiably against shrimp
from India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand.9 In U.S.—Gambling, the United States was
allowed to prohibit online gambling services from Antigua and Barbuda on public morals
grounds, but its measure violated the chapeau because it permitted some domestic remote
horserace-betting services.10 InBrazil—Retreaded Tyres, Brazilwas allowed toprohibit imports
of retreaded tires in order to combat the spread of malaria and dengue fever, but it had arbi-
trarily and unjustifiably made an exception for imports of retreaded tires from MERCOSUR
countries.11 Most recently, in EC—Seal Products, the European Union was permitted to pro-
hibit seal products on public morals grounds, but because of certain exceptions in its measure,
including an exception for seal products resulting from traditional indigenous hunts, it had
discriminated arbitrarily and unjustifiably against seal products from Canada and Norway,
including seal products hunted by Canadian traditional indigenous hunters.12
These disputes have given the chapeau a high profile, and yet it is still not clear what it
requires. In the first of these disputes, U.S.—Gasoline, the Appellate Body made two state-
ments about the chapeau that have acquired doctrinal status. The first was that a measure’s
“specific contents” are to be appraised under the subparagraphs of the general exceptions,
whereas the chapeau is concerned with “the manner in which that measure is applied.”13 The
6 Id., Art. XX(a).
7 GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. XX. The chapeau of GATS, supra note 1, Art. XIV, uses the term “like con-
ditions” instead of “same conditions,” but this difference does not appear to be significant.
8 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/
AB/R (adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gasoline].
9 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp].
10 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Bet-
ting Services,WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gambling].
11 Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R
(adopted Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Retreaded Tyres].
12 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of
Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Prod-
ucts] (reported by Gregory Shaffer and David Pabian at 109 AJIL 154 (2015)).
13 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 22.
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second statement, taken to be an implication of the first, was that “[it] is, accordingly, impor-
tant to underscore that the purpose and object of the introductory paragraph of Article XX
[that is, the chapeau] is generally the prevention of ‘abuse of the [general] exceptions.’”14
It is the contention of this article that neither of these statements accurately captures the var-
ious functions of the chapeau. Indeed, these statements do not even explain how the Appellate
Body has applied the chapeau to the facts of any of the disputes before it, including, notably,
U.S.––Gasoline itself.
Instead, it is suggested, the chapeau can be understood as comprising a set of standard eco-
nomic and policy tests. These tests are in the form of two conditions. The first condition pro-
hibitsmeasures that discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably between countries where the same
conditions prevail. This condition involves, in the first instance, a prohibition on anymeasure
that has a disproportionatelyworse (or “disparate”) economic impact on products fromcertain
countries when compared to its impact on competitive products from other countries.15 This
prohibition applies, however, only to disparate impacts on competitive products from coun-
tries in which the “same conditions prevail.” Assuming that these “conditions” are based on
factors relevant to theobjective of themeasure,16 the “sameconditions”willnotprevail in coun-
tries where these factors are relevantly different, and the chapeau’s discrimination test will not
be applicable. In this sense, the “same conditions” requirement functions as a justification,
based on the objective of the measure, for disparate impacts that are rationally related to that
objective. But even where the “same conditions” do “prevail,” it is still possible to justify the
disparate (now, almost certainly, “discriminatory”) effects of the measure. That is because the
chapeau explicitly prohibits discrimination only if it is “unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimina-
tion.” This second justification for discrimination, it is argued, is necessarily independent of the
objective of the measure, and may even––and should be able to––undermine that objective. The
effect of these dual justifications is to enhance the regulatory autonomy of WTOmembers.
The second condition in the chapeau prohibits measures that are applied in a manner con-
stituting a “disguised restriction on international trade.” This condition has so farmainly been
ignored by WTO panels and the Appellate Body, perhaps because of a lack of certainty as to
its meaning. It has, for example, been thought that a restriction on trade is “disguised” by not
being published. Such interpretations, it is suggested, miss the point. It seems far more likely
that this condition concerns illegitimate restrictions on international trade that are “disguised”
by an ostensible legitimate objective. It remains to be seen what would render a restriction on
international trade illegitimate for these purposes, but it might be suggested that, at a mini-
mum, ameasure that is adopted for explicit protectionist reasonswouldbe illegitimate for these
purposes.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I considers the Appellate Body’s approach to the cha-
peau. It argues that the Appellate Body has incorrectly distinguished between the “contents”
and “application” of a measure, and it explains why the doctrine of abuse of rights does not
generate any bright line between the subparagraphs and the chapeau. Part II highlights the
functional similarities of the conditions in the subparagraphs and in the chapeau. It argues that
14 Id.
15 For simplicity, this article refers to discrimination between “products.” For the chapeau in Article XIV of
GATS, the appropriate reference would be to “services” and also, most likely, “service suppliers.”
16 See infra text accompanying note 89.
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both sets of conditions function to limit the right to adoptmeasures for legitimate reasons and
that the only reason that some of these conditions are located in the subparagraphs and others
in the chapeau is that some conditions are specific to measures adopted for certain reasons,
whereas others are horizontally applicable to all measures adopted under the general excep-
tions.More specifically, this second part argues that it is inappropriate to consider a measure’s
discriminatory aspects under the subparagraphs and that this question should be left for anal-
ysis under the chapeau.This conclusion sets the stage for an analysis, in part III, of themeaning
of the discrimination test in the chapeau, and of the relationship of that test to the discrim-
ination tests in the substantive obligations ofGATT1994 andGATS. Part IVpresents inmore
detail the argument, summarized above, that the chapeau contains two independent, policy-
based justifications for measures with discriminatory effects. This fourth part also expands on
the meaning of “arbitrary” discrimination. It argues that this concept does not have any pro-
cedural dimension but simply refers to discriminationwithout any rationale, as opposed to dis-
crimination that has some rationale, albeit insufficient to serve as a justification. Part V
addresses the second chapeau condition concerning measures that constitute a “disguised
restriction on international trade,” and draws out its implications for measures with mixed
proper and improper purposes. Part VI concludes with some observations on the implications
of this analysis for WTO jurisprudence to date, and for the types of measures that are likely
to be analyzed under the chapeau in the future.
I. A CRITIQUE OF THE APPELLATE BODY’S APPROACH TO THE CHAPEAU
The Appellate Body’s approach to the chapeau essentially resolves into two propositions.
The first is that the subparagraphs of the general exceptions are concerned with a measure’s
“contents” and the chapeau with its “application” in practice. The second is that the subpara-
graphs are concerned with the right to adopt measures for nontrade reasons and that the cha-
peau is concernedwith the abuse of that right. It is contended that the first proposition is with-
out foundation, while the second proposition does not generate the bright line that, according
to the Appellate Body, exists between the chapeau and the subparagraphs of the general excep-
tions. This part also critiques two other propositions resulting from the Appellate Body’s
approach. The first is that the chapeau marks a “line of equilibrium” between the rights of
WTOmembers. The second is that as amatter of structural logic, the general exceptionsmust
be analyzed according to a “two-tiered” approach, beginning with the provisional justification
of a measure under the subparagraphs, and only then moving to an appraisal of the measure
under the chapeau.
The “Contents” or “Design” of a Measure, Versus Its “Application”
InU.S.—Gasoline, theAppellateBodydrew adistinctionbetween ameasure’s “specific con-
tents,” which are to be appraised under the subparagraphs of the general exceptions, and “the
manner in which that measure is applied,” which is to be appraised under the chapeau.17 It
elaborated on this distinction inU.S.—Shrimp, where it said that the “general design of amea-
sure, as distinguished from its application, is . . . to be examined in the course of determining
17 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 22.
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whether that measure falls within one or another of the paragraphs of Article XX following the
chapeau.”18 The Appellate Body then went on to say that
the application of a measure may be characterized as amounting to an abuse or misuse of
an exception of Article XX not only when the detailed operating provisions of themeasure
prescribe the arbitrary or unjustifiable activity, but alsowhere ameasure, otherwise fair and
just on its face, is actually applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner. The standards
of the chapeau, in our view, project both substantive and procedural requirements.19
This statement appears tomean that for the purposes of appraising a “measure” under the gen-
eral exceptions, that “measure” can be divided into an abstract element that is not “applied”
and a concrete element that is “applied.” But any such distinction is spurious. As a matter of
legal logic, it is only a single “measure,”20 which is to say instance of conduct, that requires jus-
tification under the general exceptions.21
But how is a “measure” to be identified? It would seem that a “measure” is identified by ref-
erence to the terms of the original rule that the “measure” violates.22 Some rules identify “mea-
sures” in terms of their formal characteristics23 or purposes.24 Other rules refer to “measures”
in terms of their effects. A “measure” for the purposes of the most-favored-nation obligation
in GATT 1994 is identified as that instance of conduct that does not accord an “advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity” to products from one country that it accords to like products
of another WTO member.25 By contrast, a “measure” for the purposes of the most favored-
nation-obligation in GATS will be identified as conduct by aWTOmember that causes “less
18 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 116.
19 Id., para. 160.
20 A measure can be any act or omission attributable to theWTOmember at issue. See Appellate Body Report,
United States—Sunset Review of Anti-dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Steel Flat Products from Japan, para. 81,
WT/DS244/AB/R (adopted Jan. 9, 2004), referring to theUnderstanding onRules andProceduresGoverning the
Settlement of Disputes, Art. 3.3, Apr. 15, 1994,WTOAgreement, supra note 1, Annex 2, 1869UNTS 401 [here-
inafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. It may also be an unpublished practice, as in Appellate Body Report,
Argentina—Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WT/DS444/AB/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2015).
21 See generally Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission on theWork of Its Fifty-Third Session, UNGAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 26, UN
Doc. A/56/10 (2001). The articles are annexed to General Assembly Resolution 56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001). Articles
2 and 12 describe “wrongful acts” as conduct consisting of acts or omissions, and Articles 20 to 25 describe cir-
cumstances precluding the wrongfulness of these same “acts.” In the WTO context, see Appellate Body Report,
Thailand—Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, para. 177, WT/DS371/AB/R (adopted
July 15, 2011) (referring to “treatment”), andWilliamDavey&KeithMaskus,Thailand—Cigarettes (Philippines):
A More Serious Role for the “Less Favourable Treatment” Standard of Article III, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 163, 183
(2013). See also infra text accompanying note 68.
22 The language of “violation” is used here as shorthand. It is suggested below, see infra text accompanying note
99, that the general exceptions apply to “nonviolation” measures. If so, then the “measure” would be defined by
reference to the conduct causing the relevant “nullification or impairment” of “benefits” accruing to the affected
WTO member under GATT 1994 or GATS.
23 For example, the definition of “customs duties” in GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. II, and of certain “quan-
titative restrictions” in GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. XI:1. See also infra note 60.
24 For example, the definition of “sanitary or phytosanitary measure” in the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Substances, Annex A, para. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex
1A, 1867 UNTS 493.
25 GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. I:1.
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favourable treatment” to services and service suppliers of any otherWTOmember than it does
to the like services and service suppliers of any other country.26
U.S.––Gasoline is illustrative. In that case the Appellate Body expressly defined the “mea-
sure” at issue to include different “baseline” standards applicable to U.S. and Venezuelan gas-
oline producers.27 The Appellate Body then analyzed precisely that same measure under the
relevant substantive nondiscrimination obligation, the relevant subparagraph of the general
exceptions, and then the chapeau of the general exceptions.28Notably, the Appellate Body did
not at any stage divide the “measure” into abstract and applied elements.29 Its theoretical dis-
tinction between the “contents” and the “application” of a measure remained exactly that––
theoretical.
The distinction between the “contents” (or “design”) and “application” of a measure was
reiterated in U.S.—Shrimp. But here, too, this distinction had less meaning than is sometimes
thought. The panel had found that “the import ban on shrimp and shrimp products as applied
by the United States on the basis of Section 609 of Public Law 101–162 is not consistent with
Article XI:1 of GATT 1994.”30 On appeal, the Appellate Body distinguished between regu-
latory levels. In relation to whether the measure related to the conservation of exhaustible nat-
ural resources, the Appellate Body referred to the statute and implementing guidelines.31 In
relation to the chapeau it referred to the statute, the implementing guidelines andU.S. admin-
istrative practice.32
As ArwelDavies has noted, the Appellate Body’s analytical separation of these different reg-
ulatory levels canbe explainedby the evidence required todeterminewhether a given condition
had been satisfied.33 For the Appellate Body to determine whether the measure was adopted
26 GATS, supra note 1, Art. II.1. When it is burdensome conduct that produces “less favourable treatment”, it
is arguably that burdensome conduct alone that constitutes the “measure.” Any parallel, less burdensome conduct
should arguably not be treated as part of the “measure” but should be considered, if at all, in the context of deter-
mining whether the “less favourable treatment” is caused by the more burdensome conduct in question.
27 Appellate BodyReport,U.S.—Gasoline, supranote 8, at 13–14.TheAppellate Bodymight have instead iden-
tified the “measure” as the most burdensome baseline that caused “less favourable treatment,” as noted supra note
26. That it did not is immaterial, however, to the result.
28 Id. (measure under Articles III and XX of GATT 1994, supra note 1); id. at 16 (same measure under Article
XX(g) of GATT 1994); id. at 22 (samemeasure under the chapeau and Article XX(g) of GATT 1994). The Appel-
late Body is sometimes criticized for having identified a discriminatory “measure” that violated a substantive non-
discrimination obligation, but then having justified a different, broader “measure” under Article XX of GATT
1994. RobertHudec said that “the Appellate Body ruled that the ‘measure’ to be tested [under Article XX ofGATT
1994] was the entire regulation in which the GATT-illegal provision appeared.” Robert Hudec, GATT/W TO Con-
straints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 32 INT’L LAW. 619, 637 (1998). To the same
effect, see Davey &Maskus, supra note 21, at 182–83. This criticism is misdirected. On the relevance of the dis-
criminatory and other features of themeasure under different GATT 1994 provisions, see infra text accompanying
notes 66–70.
29 The Appellate Body did discuss, in the context of the chapeau, the failure of the U.S. authorities to cooperate
with Venezuela and its producers, but the purpose of the discussion was to identify alternative less discriminatory
measures. That is not the same as treating the U.S. failure to cooperate as the “application” of the measure at issue.
See Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 27–28.
30 Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, para. 8.1,
WT/DS58/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998).
31 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 141.
32 Id., para 161.
33 See Arwel Davies, Interpreting the Chapeau of GATT Article XX in Light of the ‘New’ Approach in Brazil-Tyres,
43 J. WORLD TRADE 507, 529–30 (2009). Davies also refers in this context to the Appellate Body’s reports in
U.S.—Gambling, supra note 10, and Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, supra note 11.
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for the purpose of “conserving exhaustible natural resources,” it was unnecessary, as a matter
of evidence, to consider thepractice of the administrative authorities. By contrast, to determine
whether themeasure discriminated against foreign shrimp producers and, if so, whether doing
so was necessary for a particular purpose, the Appellate Body had to consider this practice and
its effects.34
Subsequent cases confirm the fiction of the supposed distinction between the “contents” or
“design” and the “application” of a measure. In China—Rare Earths, the Appellate Body said
that a panel could look beyond the “design” of the measure and take into account factual evi-
dence in determining whether a measure related to the “conservation of exhaustible natural
resources.”35 It is likely that if, inU.S.—Shrimp, it had been claimed thatU.S. authorities were
prohibiting shrimp imports for a purpose other than the “conservation of exhaustible natural
resources,” theAppellate Bodywould also have permitted the consideration of evidence to that
effect. By contrast, in EC—Seal Products, where empirical evidence was lacking as to whether
the measure at issue met the chapeau’s discrimination conditions, the Appellate Body looked
at the “actual or expected application” of the measure, based on its “design, architecture, and
revealing structure.”36 The use, in the context of the chapeau, of language previously reserved
for Article XX(g) of GATT 1994 is itself revealing.
In short, the supposed distinction between the a measure’s “design” or “contents,” on the
one hand, and its “application,” on the other, is merely descriptive of the evidence that is
required and available todemonstratewhether ameasuremeets a given condition in the general
exceptions; it does not support the notion that there is a functional distinction between the
chapeau and the subparagraphs of the general exceptions.
The Chapeau and the Doctrine of Abuse of Rights
In U.S.––Gasoline, the Appellate Body’s initial distinction between a measure’s “specific
contents” and its “application” set the stage for its view that the chapeau is concernedwith pre-
venting the abuse of rights granted under the general exceptions.37 It elaborated on this posi-
tion in U.S.—Shrimp, where it said:
The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good faith.
This principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle of international
law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this general principle, the
application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise
of a state’s rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right “impinges on the field
covered by [a] treaty obligation, itmust be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably.”38
34 Indeed, in United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Recourse to Article 21.5
of the DSU by Malaysia), para. 79, WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, U.S.—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia)], the Appellate Body stated that for the purposes of the chapeau,
the “measure” comprised legislation, implementing regulation, and practice.
35 Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten andMolyb-
denum, paras. 5.113, .138, WT/DS431/AB/R (adopted Aug. 29, 2014).
36 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 12, para. 5.302. The Appellate Body’s willingness to
consider the “expected application” of the measure contrasts with U.S.—Shrimp (Article. 21.5—Malaysia), supra
note 34, para. 148, where it said that, “[a]s Malaysia has not applied for certification, any consideration of whether
Malaysia would be certified would be speculation.”
37 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 22.
38 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 158.
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It is contended here that, while it is permissible for the Appellate Body to draw an analogy
between the conditions in the chapeau and the doctrine of abuse of rights, the same analogy
can be drawn in relation to all of the conditions in the general exceptions.39 Contrary to the
Appellate Body’s view, the doctrine of abuse of rights does not serve as an analytical basis for
delimiting the chapeau from the subparagraphs of the general exceptions.
To explain this point in more detail, it is necessary to refer to Bin Cheng’s analysis of the
doctrine of abuse of rights, which was cited by (and evidently served as an inspiration for) the
Appellate Body in the quoted passage.40 The relevant discussion appears in Cheng’s book,
under the heading “Rights and Treaty Obligations,” where he states:
Whatever the limits of the right might have been before the assumption of the obli-
gation, from then onwards, the right is subject to a restriction. Henceforth, whenever
its exercise impinges on the field covered by the treaty obligation, it must be exercised
bona fide, that is to say reasonably. A reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right in
such a case is one which is appropriate and necessary for the purpose of the right . . . .
But the exercise of the right in such a manner as to prejudice the interests of the other
contracting party arising out of the treaty is unreasonable and is considered as inconsistent
with the bonafide execution of the treaty obligation, and a breach of the treaty. In thisway,
the principle of good faith establishes an interdependence between the rights of a State and
its obligations. By weighing the conflicting interests covered by the right and the obliga-
tion, it delimits them in such a way as to render the exercise of the right compatible with
the spirit of the obligation.41
This passage underlies the Appellate Body’s understanding of the doctrine of abuse of rights
in the context of treaty obligations. But it is important to understand this passage in the context
of theNorth Atlantic Coast Fisheries case,42 whichCheng discusses at some length immediately
before the quotation above. That case concerned a treaty obligation granting U.S. fishermen
a right to fish in UK waters. The question was whether the United Kingdom was entitled to
regulate fishing in its waters, the treaty being silent on this point. The arbitral tribunal stated
that, notwithstanding its treaty obligations, the United Kingdom retained a right to regulate
for certain purposes, subject to various conditions. The tribunal described the permitted reg-
ulations as follows:
Regulations which are (1) appropriate or necessary for the protection and preservation
of such fisheries, or (2) desirable or necessary on grounds of public order andmorals with-
out unnecessarily interfering with the fishery itself, and in both cases equitable and fair as
between local and American fishermen, and not so framed as to give unfairly an advantage
to the former over the latter class, are not inconsistent with the obligation to execute the
Treaty in good faith, and are therefore reasonable and not in violation of the Treaty.43
39 In The W TO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures,
22U. PA J. INT’L. ECON. L. 739, 839 (2001), SanfordGainesmakes the same point, albeit without a detailed anal-
ysis of the doctrine of abuse of rights.
40 BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS,
ch. 4 (1953), quoted in Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 158 n.156.
41 CHENG, supra note 40, at 125.
42 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries (UK v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 167 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910).
43 Id. at 189.
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This passage bears an uncanny resemblance to the general exceptions of GATT andGATS.
It establishes a right to regulate for a specific purpose, subject to the condition that the reg-
ulationsmust be necessary for achieving that purpose, and that they do not discriminate unjus-
tifiably between foreign and domestic fishermen.
It is also notable that this passage does not establish any “weighing [of] the conflicting inter-
ests” of the parties to the treaty, as Cheng proposed, at least in the sense that one of these inter-
ests could potentially outweigh the other. The hierarchy of values is fixed: the United King-
dom’s right to regulate prevails over the right of U.S. fishermen to fish in those waters. This
right is limited only by the requirements not to regulate unnecessarily and not to discriminate
unnecessarily.
Why, then, did Cheng use the terminology of weighing conflicting interests? It may be that
he was influenced by the use of the doctrine of abuse of rights in other contexts, where it has
been customary to “weigh” the interests of parties, such as shared resources or transboundary
harm.44 But as Georg Schwarzenberger has pointed out, situations described in terms of abuse
of rights may sometimes be better understood as involving an underlying equitable rule that
permits such “weighing” of interests.45
There is also a broader question to be addressed: is it appropriate to use the language of abuse
of rights in relation to conduct that is not an “abuse” of rights, in the sense of being consciously
adopted for an improper purpose or, to put it another way, adopted in bad faith? The doctrine
of abuse of rights and the related concept of “good faith” are frequently interpreted in thismore
limited way.46 It is also true, however, that in some areas of the law, especially those involving
individual rights, it is more customary to describe harmful conduct in terms of an abuse of
rights, even if this conduct is not adopted for an improper purpose. For example, arbitrary dis-
crimination against aliens is sometimes described as an abuse of rights.47 Whether it is appro-
priate to describe arbitrary discrimination against states in similar terms, even when the rel-
evant conduct is not in bad faith, is at best an open question.
For present purposes, the results of this analysis are as follows. On the narrowest, and least
controversial, understanding of the doctrine of abuse of rights, it would be appropriate to con-
sider as an abuse of rights anymeasure that is adopted for an improper purpose, which is to say,
44 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 162–65 (rev. ed. 1958); F. V. Garcia Amador, State Responsibility: Some New Problems, 94 RECUEIL DES
COURS 365, 381 (1958 II); Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, a New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389,
424–29 (2002).
45 Georg Schwarzenberger, Uses and Abuses of the “Abuse of Rights” in International Law, 42 TRANSACTIONS
GROTIUS SOC’Y 147, 153–54, 172, 177 (1956). The doctrine of abuse of rights also has more application when
the rights at issue are otherwise considered to be absolute.
46 See the individual opinions in Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan) (Int’l Ct. Justice Mar. 31, 2014) in
relation to the question whether Japan had acted in good faith. See id., Diss. Op.Owada, J., paras. 21–22; id., Diss.
Op. Abraham, J., paras. 28–29; id., Diss. Op. Yusuf, J., para. 54; id., Sep. Op. Greenwood, J., para. 29; id., Sep.
Op. Sebutinde, J., para. 29. See also Sonia Rolland, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Inter-
vening), 108 AJIL 496, 501 (2014). In EU law the principle of abuse of rights also implies that an act had had an
improper purpose.SeeStefanVogenauer,The Prohibition of Abuse of Law: An Emerging General Principle of EU Law,
in PROHIBITIONOFABUSEOF LAW: ANEWGENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EULAW? (Rita de la Feria& Stefan Voge-
nauer eds., 2011). The same applies in investment arbitrations. SeeHervé Ascensio,Abuse of Process in International
Investment Arbitration, J INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 763, 780 (2014).
47 CHENG, supra note 40, at 133; Robert Kolb, La bonne foi en droit international public, REVUE BELGE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 661, 721–22 (1998); Byers, supra note 44, at 424–29 (2002). But see Schwarzenberger,
supra note 45, at 172, 177 (stating that these rules on aliens, too, are merely rules of customary international law).
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in bad faith. For reasons to be explained, this conceptionwould cover the condition in the cha-
peau prohibiting “disguised restrictions on international trade.”48 The doctrine of abuse of
rights could also cover measures that are adopted without a good purpose and that therefore
fail tomeet the requirement that it they be adopted for legitimate purposes under the subpara-
graphs of the general exceptions.On themost extended understanding of the doctrine of abuse
of rights, it would be possible also to describe as an abuse of rights ameasure that unnecessarily
harms or discriminates against aWTOmember. But whichever of these interpretations of the
doctrine of abuse of rights is most appealing, the doctrine cannot serve to delimit the chapeau
from the subparagraphs of the general exceptions.On any of these interpretations, the doctrine
of abuse of rights describes conditions that are found in both locations. Moreover, on the
broadest view, it applies to all of those conditions cumulatively.
The “Line of Equilibrium” and the “Two-Tiered Analysis”
The foregoing analysis has implications for two of the Appellate Body’s ancillary proposi-
tions concerning the relationship between the subparagraphs and the chapeau of the general
exceptions.The first of these propositions is that the “task of interpreting and applying the cha-
peau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium
between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the
otherMembers under varying substantive provisions.”49 This proposition seems to have been
inspired byCheng’s statement that the doctrine of abuse of rights demarcates a “line delimiting
the rights of both parties . . . traced at a point where there is a reasonable balance between the
conflicting interests involved.”50 However, this statement must be treated with some care. If
there is a “line of equilibrium” between the rights of WTOmembers, then, for reasons given
above in the context of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, it is a line that does not entail
any balancing of these rights. Nor, for reasons mentioned, could any such line be drawn
between the chapeau and the subparagraphs of the general exceptions. It would have to be
drawn around all of the conditions of the general exceptions. It is suggested that this “line of
equilibrium” is an unhelpful and potentially misleading metaphor that should be abandoned.
The second of the Appellate Body’s propositions, originating in U.S.—Gasoline, is that the
general exceptions must be analyzed according to a “two-tiered” analysis. According to this
analysis, a measure must first be “provisionally justified” under one of the subparagraphs of
Article XX, and then it must be shown to be consistent with the conditions of the article’s cha-
peau.51 In U.S.—Shrimp, the Appellate Body affirmed this approach and went on to explain
why it was structurally necessary. It said that the “task of interpreting the chapeau so as to pre-
vent the abuse or misuse of the specific exemptions provided for in Article XX is rendered very
difficult, if indeed it remains possible at all, where the interpreter . . . has not first identified
and examined the specific exception threatened with abuse.”52 This is not entirely true. For
reasons to be explained, it is necessary to identify a measure’s purpose in order to determine
48 See part V below.
49 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 159.
50 CHENG, supra note 40, at 132.
51 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 20.
52 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 120.
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whether the “same conditions” prevail in different countries and alsowhether themeasure con-
stitutes a “disguised restriction on international trade.” But it does not follow that themeasure
must pass all of the other conditions set out in the subparagraphs before being analyzed under
the chapeau. This is not to say that a “two-tiered” analysis might not be sensible when an issue
can be disposed of more efficiently under a subparagraph than under the chapeau. But that is
merely a matter of judicial economy. Contrary to the Appellate Body’s view, a “two-tiered”
analysis is not structurally necessary, and in some cases, it might even be an inefficient way to
assess a situation.
II. THE SUBPARAGRAPHS OF THEGENERAL EXCEPTIONS
Having identified certain problemswith the Appellate Body’s approach to the chapeau, this
article now offers an alternative interpretation. It suggests that the chapeau of the general
exceptions can be understood in terms of a set of legal conditions that complement, without
duplicating, the conditions set out in the subparagraphs of the general exceptions.
The central function of the subparagraphs is to establish a right to adoptmeasures for certain
legitimate objectives. This right is always subject to a condition that the measure is (or will be)
minimally effective in achieving the relevant object, even if the degree of likelihood can vary
according to the objective at stake.53 Some subparagraphs contain ancillary conditions. Article
XX(g) of GATT 1994 permits measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources,” but only “if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption,”54 and Article XX(j) of GATT 1994 permits measures
“essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply,” pro-
vided that these measures are “discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have
ceased to exist.”
In addition, some of the subparagraphs require, as a distinct condition, that ameasuremust
be “necessary” to achieve a legitimate objective.55 The Appellate Body discussed the meaning
of this term in Korea—Various Measures on Beef.56 It said that a measure’s “necessity” for
achieving one of the objectives in the subparagraphs depends on the “weighing and balancing”
53 Appellate BodyReport,U.S.—Gambling, supranote 10, para. 292. InEC—Seal Products, supranote 12, para.
5.215, the Appellate Body said that there was no “pre-determined threshold level of contribution” for determining
whether a measure was “necessary” to protect public morals. This does not mean that a measure need not make any
contribution to the protection of public morals. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning
the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, para. 322 n.647,WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted June
13, 2012) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Tuna II], where the Appellate Body said, in the context of
the “necessity” test in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
supranote 1, Annex 1A, 1868UNTS120 [hereinafter TBTAgreement], that a panelmay not be required to under-
take a review of alternativemeasures “if ameasure is trade restrictive andmakes no contribution to the achievement
of the legitimate objective.”The legitimate objectives set out in theArticle 2.2 of theTBTAgreement include public
morals. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal
Products, para. 7.418, WT/DS400/R (adopted, as modified, June 18, 2014).
54 See Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and
Molybdenum, supra note 35, paras. 5.136–.141.
55 See GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. XX(a) (protection of public morals), (b) (protection of human, animal,
or plant life or health), (d) (compliance with certain domestic laws or regulations); GATS, supra note 1, Art. XX(a)
(protection of public morals and maintenance of public order), (b) (protection of human, animal, or plant life or
health), (c) (compliance with certain domestic laws or regulations).
56 Appellate BodyReport, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,Chilled andFrozenBeef,WT/DS161/
AB/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Korea—Various Measures on Beef].
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of several factors, including “the contributionmade by the compliancemeasure to the enforce-
ment of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values pro-
tected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on
imports or exports.”57 It added, importantly, that “theweighing andbalancing processwe have
outlined is comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent alternative
measure which the Member concerned could ‘reasonably be expected to employ’ is available,
or whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is ‘reasonably available.’”58
It is significant that the Appellate Body refers here to a reasonably available, “less WTO-
inconsistent” alternative measure. Because almost all of the obligations in the GATT 1994 are
targeted at discriminatory measures, whether expressly59 or by necessary implication,60 this
phrase implies not only that the measure at issue must be no more trade restrictive than any
other reasonably available alternative measure, in the simple sense of limiting international
transactions,61 but that it must also be nomore discriminatory than any other reasonably avail-
able alternative measure, in the sense of affecting conditions of competition for products of
different origins.62 Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Appellate Body affirmed this
interpretationof “WTO-inconsistency” insofar as it expressly considered “the extent towhich
the compliance measure produces restrictive effects on international commerce, that is, in
57 Id., para. 164. The Appellate Body endorsed this formulation of the “necessity” test in EC—Seal Products,
supra note 12, paras. 5.169, .214. On “weighing and balancing” beyond the consideration of alternative measures,
see Donald Regan, The Meaning of ‘Necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit
Balancing, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 347 (2007).
58 Appellate Body Report, Korea—VariousMeasures on Beef, supra note 56, para. 166. This formulation of the
“necessity” test originates in GATT Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, para. 5.26,
L/6439 (adopted Nov. 7, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1989). The Appellate Body has left open
thepossibility that the considerationof reasonably available alternativesmightnot be required in all cases.SeeAppel-
late Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 12, para. 5.215 n.1299; Appellate Body Report, U.S.––Tuna II,
supra note 53, para. 322 n.647 (in relation to the TBT Agreement, supra note 53, Art. 2.2).
59 E.g., GATT 1994, supra note 1, Arts. I, III; GATS, supra note 1, Arts. II, XVII.
60 Discrimination is implicit in the customs duties and other charges prohibited by Article II of GATT 1994,
supranote 1, and the quantitative restrictions prohibited byArticle XI:1 ofGATT1994, as by definition, suchmea-
sures apply only to foreign goods. In India—Additional and Extra-additional Duties on Imports from the United
States, para. 158, WT/DS360/AB/R (adopted Nov. 17, 2008), the Appellate Body said that Article II:1(b) of
GATT 1994 prohibited certain “other duties and charges” even if these were not discriminatory. It reasoned that
such duties and chargesmay be applied for nonprotectionist purposes and in “situations where there is no domestic
production (or even expectations of future domestic production).” It might have been better to say that, because
such duties and charges are ipso facto discriminatory, a violation of Article II of GATT1994 does not depend upon
identifying any actual or expected protectionist effects.
61 For this definitionof a trade restriction, seeAppellateBodyReport,China—Measures Related to the Exportation
of Various Raw Materials, para. 319, WT/DS394/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22, 2012), para. 319, and Appellate Body
Report, U.S.—Tuna II, supra note 53, para. 319.
62 The trade-restrictive and discriminatory effects of a measure are independent and can be, but need not be,
cumulative. A tax on alcoholic beverages that disproportionately affects products from one country compared to
another is trade restrictive, in that it affects sales of the taxed beverages, and is also discriminatory, in that it does
not equally affect all competitive products. By contrast, a domestic regulation that prohibits sales of all like products
and that has an equal impact on products regardless of their origin is trade restrictive but not discriminatory. A sub-
sidy granted only to domestic goods or services is discriminatory but not trade restrictive. By way of analogy with
this last example, discriminatory trade preferences that have negative effects on the exports of third countries are
not considered to “raise barriers” to the trade of those third countries within the meaning of Article XXIV:4 of
GATT1994, supranote 1, or paragraph 3(a) of the EnablingClause,Differential andMore Favourable Treatment,
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1979). I am
grateful to James Flett for provoking me to consider these distinctions in more detail.
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respect of a measure inconsistent with [GATT 1994] Article III:4 [a nondiscrimination obli-
gation], restrictive effects on imported goods.”63
Since Korea––Various Measures on Beef, the Appellate Body has gone in two directions. In
Thailand––Cigarettes (Philippines) theAppellateBody considered the “necessity” test inArticle
XX(d) of GATT 1994 exclusively in terms of the discriminatory effects of the measure at
issue.64 By contrast, in other cases the Appellate Body interpreted the “necessity” test in Article
XX(b) of GATT 1994 exclusively in terms of the trade-restrictive effects of the measure. In
Brazil—Retreaded Tyres the Appellate Body did not even cite Korea—Various Measures on
Beef.65Usually, theAppellate Body has cited the “lessWTO-inconsistent” test ofKorea—Var-
ious Measures on Beef but has then gone on to consider solely the trade-restrictive effects of the
measure at issue.66
This divergence in the Appellate Body’s approach to the “necessity” test under the subpara-
graphs of the general exceptions raises the question whether this test should be concerned with
the trade-restrictive or the discriminatory effects of a measure, or both. In considering this
question it is necessary to bear inmind an important conceptual distinction between the iden-
tity of the “measure” and the features of that “measure” that are relevant under any given rule.
This conceptual distinction is sometimes overlooked. In particular, at the stage of determining
whether a given instance of conduct violates an obligation, the distinction is necessarily con-
flated, and that is because, as explained above, a “measure” is identifiedby reference to the terms
of the rule that it violates. As noted above, for the purposes of an obligation prohibiting “less
favorable treatment,” any given instance of conduct that accords “less favorable treatment”will
be the identified “measure.” But it does not follow that for other rules applicable to that mea-
sure, including the general exceptions, it is only this feature of the “measure” that will be rel-
evant. These other rules may be concerned with the measure’s other features, such as its pur-
poses or its economic or non-economic effects. What is important under Article XX(g) of
GATT 1994 is not whether the measure at issue is discriminatory but whether it was adopted
for the purpose of conserving exhaustible natural resources.
The conceptual distinction between the identification of a “measure,” on the one hand, and
the legal relevance of the different features of that “measure,” on the other, is an important one.
In United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the GATT panel stated that “what has
to be justified as ‘necessary’ under Article XX(d) is each of the inconsistencies with another
GATTArticle found to exist” rather than “Section 337 as a system.”67 Likewise, inThailand—
Cigarettes (Philippines), the Appellate Body said that Thailand should have “justif[ied] the dif-
ferential treatment afforded to imported versus domestic cigarettes under its measure.”68 In
63 Appellate Body Report, Korea—Various Measures on Beef, supra note 56, para. 163 (footnote omitted).
64 Appellate Body Report, Thailand—Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, supra
note 21, para. 179.
65 Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, supra note 11, para. 178.
66 See Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gambling, supra note 10 (compare paragraphs 305 and 309). In Appellate
BodyReport,EC—Seal Products, supranote12, para. 5.169, theAppellateBody cited its decision inKorea—Various
Measures on Beef, supra note 56, para. 164, for the proposition that the “the trade-restrictiveness of the measure”
is a relevant factor, but it omitted to mention that, as noted, supra text accompanying notes 59–63, it was the dis-
criminatory aspects of the measures that were considered important in that case.
67 GATT Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 58, para. 5.27.
68 Appellate Body Report, Thailand—Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, supra
note 21, para. 179.
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other words the same “treatment” that violates a substantive obligation must be shown to be
“necessary” to a legitimate objective.69 For the reasons mentioned above, both statements are
correct insofar as they indicate that it is the same “measure” (or, to use the Appellate Body’s
term, “treatment”) that violates an obligation that requires justification.70 But both statements
are incorrect insofar as they goon to reason that the samediscriminatory features of a “measure”
that are relevant for the primary rule must also therefore be relevant for purposes of any given
rule in the general exceptions. Just as the discriminatory effects of a measure, if any, are irrel-
evant under Article XX(g) of GATT 1994, there is no a priori reason that a measure’s discrim-
inatory effects must be relevant to the “necessity” test in Article XX(d) or in other subpara-
graphs.
As a matter of legal logic, there is consequently no need to consider the discriminatory fea-
tures of a measure under the subparagraphs. Moreover, there are reasons to resist taking such
an approach. First, the chapeau already contains a discrimination condition, which, as will be
explained in more detail, is subject to two independent justifications. To apply a discrimina-
tion condition under the subparagraphswithout reference to these justifications, which are not
available under the subparagraphs, would be equivalent to finding a violation of a substantive
obligation of an agreement without considering any available exceptions to that obligation.
Second, for some measures it is logically impossible to apply a “no less discriminatory” and
a “no less trade restrictive” test at the same time. An example is the measure in Brazil—
Retreaded Tyres, which concerned an import prohibition on retreaded tires from all sources
exceptMERCOSURcountries.Appraising thismeasureunderArticleXX(b) ofGATT1994, the
Appellate Body found that the import prohibition was the least trade-restrictive measure rea-
sonably available that achieved Brazil’s objective of protecting public health. The Appellate
Bodydidnot consider at that stage, however,whether a less discriminatorymeasuremight have
been available. If one considers the less discriminatory alternatives that might have been avail-
able, thatmakes perfect sense.On the onehand,Brazilmight have reduced the trade-restrictive
aspects of itsmeasure, but such an alternativemeasurewouldno longer havemetBrazil’s public
health objectives. Alternatively, Brazil might have extended its import prohibition to MERCO-
SUR countries, but such an alternativemeasure would have beenmore trade restrictive than the
measure at issue—and therefore, by definition, unnecessary to achieve its objectives. One can
generalize: if a measure is the least trade-restrictive measure reasonably available that achieves
a legitimate objective and if discrimination results from the non-application of that measure
to all competitive products, then there will be a trade-off between its trade-restrictive and its
discriminatory effects. In such cases a less discriminatorymeasure either will fail to achieve the
legitimate objective or will be more trade restrictive than the measure at issue.
Nevertheless, it might be objected that it would be wrong for a measure whose discrimina-
tory effects are justified, under the chapeau, to fail to be justified under a subparagraph solely
because it is trade restrictive.This objection rests on the assumption thatGATT1994prohibits
only discriminatorymeasures.71 It is not clear, however, that the assumption is correct. In addi-
tion to prohibiting measures that are discriminatory, GATT 1994 prohibits measures that are
69 Id., para. 177.
70 See supra note 21.
71 I am grateful to Frieder Roessler for insightful discussions on this issue.
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both discriminatory and trade restrictive.72 There is no inconsistency in requiring the trade-
restrictive aspects of such measures to be independently justified under the subparagraphs of
the general exceptions.
For these reasons, it is proposed that it is appropriate to limit the “necessity” test under the
subparagraphs of the general exceptions to a consideration of a measure’s trade restrictiveness,
and to analyze its discriminatory effects, if any, under the chapeau.This approach respects both
the text of the chapeau and, importantly, the qualifications relating to the application of the
chapeau’s discrimination test. It is the only logicalwayof dealingwith thosemeasures that pres-
ent a trade-off between their trade-restrictive and discriminatory effects. It accords with the
Appellate Body’s general practice, albeit with two exceptions, which are based on erroneous
reasoning. Finally, it corresponds to the structure of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, in which a measure’s discriminatory effects are considered under one provision and its
trade-restrictive effects under another, with the possibility of justifying the measure, on inde-
pendent policy grounds, under either provision.73
III. DISCRIMINATIONUNDER THE CHAPEAU
If discrimination is to be analyzed solely under the chapeau, that test for discrimination
needs to be clearly elaborated and, insofar as necessary, distinguished from other, related, dis-
crimination tests, particularly those in the substantivemost-favored-nation andnational-treat-
ment obligations in GATT 1994 and GATS. Appellate Body jurisprudence has been surpris-
ingly inconsistent, however, on such a fundamental issue.
The first dispute in which this matter was considered was U.S.—Gasoline. The Appellate
Body said that the nondiscrimination conditions in the chapeau are different from those in the
substantive nondiscrimination obligations in GATT 1994:
The enterprise of applyingArticle XXwould clearly be an unprofitable one if it involved
no more than applying the standard used in finding that the baseline establishment rules
were inconsistent with Article III:4 [a national treatment obligation]. That would also be
true if thefindingwereoneof inconsistencywith someother substantive rule of theGeneral
Agreement. The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s) by
which a violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have occurred. To proceed
down that path would be both to empty the chapeau of its contents and to deprive the
exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j) of meaning. Such recourse would also confuse the ques-
tion of whether inconsistencywith a substantive rule existed, with the further and separate
question arising under the chapeau of Article XX as towhether that inconsistencywas nev-
ertheless justified.74
72 See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
73 Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, supra note 53, is concerned with the questions whether a measure causes
a disparate impact on (or between) foreign products and, if so, whether that disparate impact stems exclusively from
a legitimate regulatory distinction, and Article 2.2 states that “technical regulations shall not be more trade-restric-
tive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.” On the
final clause, “taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create,” see Chris Downes, Worth Shopping Around?
Defending Regulatory Autonomy Under the SPS and TBT Agreements, WORLD TRADE REV. (forthcoming; FIRST-
VIEW at 18–20 (2015)), and Appellate Body Report, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico), paras. 5.253–.255,WT/DS384/AB/RW
(adopted May 29, 2015).
74 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 23.
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The Appellate Body affirmed this reasoning in U.S.—Shrimp, noting that “the nature and
quality of this discrimination [in the chapeau] is different from the discrimination in the treat-
ment of products which was already found to be inconsistent with one of the substantive obli-
gations of the GATT 1994.”75
This reasoning is hard to follow. It seems obvious that to apply the same discrimination test
under a substantive nondiscrimination obligation and under the chapeau would not “empty
the chapeau of its contents.” The reason is simple: the chapeau does not prohibit all discrim-
inatory measures but only measures that discriminate arbitrarily and unjustifiably between
products from countries where the same conditions prevail.
The Appellate Body itself now also takes a different view. In EC—Seal Products, the Appel-
lateBody referred tobothof the abovepassages and thencontinued: “This doesnotmean,how-
ever, that the circumstances that bring about the discrimination that is to be examined under
the chapeau cannot be the same as those that led to the finding of a violation of a substantive
provision of the GATT 1994.”76 Moreover, it went on to determine that “in the present case,
the causes of the ‘discrimination’ found to exist under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 are the
same as those to be examined under the chapeau.”77 The clear implication is that an identical
discrimination test can be used in both contexts.
It is therefore now clear that discrimination under the chapeau is a fundamentally economic
concept—and one that is to be determined by comparing products from different countries
that are competitive in the domestic marketplace.78 Moreover, this position is well in accord
with theAppellate Body’s practice. InU.S.—Gasoline, the Appellate Body consideredwhether
the United States regulations discriminated between gasoline from Venezuela and that from
theUnited States. Notwithstanding what the Appellate Body said about the different discrim-
ination tests that should be applicable,79 it was evident from the panel’s earlier finding of dis-
crimination that one of the reasons for finding discrimination was that the relevant products
were competitive in the U.S. marketplace.80 In U.S.—Shrimp the Appellate Body also seems
to have assumed that shrimp from the various disputing parties was competitive, while in Bra-
zil—Retreaded Tyres, the panel had established that the retreaded tires from the disputing par-
ties were “like.”81 U.S.—Gambling presents an anomaly: it was not established, and it was not
obvious, that domestic telephone-betting services andAntiguan online gambling services were
in competition in the U.S. market. However, the Appellate Body’s failure to analyze this issue
75 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 150.
76 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 12, para. 5.298.
77 Id., para. 5.318.
78 In EC—Seal Products, supra note 12, para. 5.130, the Appellate Body found that the European Union had
discriminated against seal products of Canadian and Norwegian origin, respectively, in violation of Article I:1 of
GATT 1994, supra note 1, and adopted this reasoning in determining whether there was any discrimination under
the chapeau, id., para 5.318. The question of the relevant comparators was discussed in the context of the TBT
Agreement, supra note 53, Art. 2.1, in Panel Report,European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation
and Marketing of Seal Products, supra note 53, paras. 7.149–.154, and found to be “like,” id., para. 7.594.
79 See supra text accompanying note 74.
80 Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, para. 6.16,
WT/DS2/R (adopted, as modified, May 20, 1996).
81 Panel Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of RetreadedTyres,WT/DS332/R, para. 7.235 (adopted,
as modified, Dec. 17, 2007).
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arguably says more about the Appellate Body’s analysis than it does about the principle at
issue.82
History also supports the proposition that the chapeau’s nondiscrimination test is to be con-
sidered in terms of competitive products in a domestic marketplace, as the “chapeau” in the
1938 U.S.-Canada Reciprocal Trade Agreement, for example, made plain:
Subject to the requirement that, under like circumstances and conditions, there shall be
no arbitrary discrimination by either country against articles the growth, produce or man-
ufacture of the other country in favor of the like articles the growth, produce or manufac-
ture of any other foreign country, the provisions of this Agreement shall not extend to pro-
hibitions or restrictions . . . .83
This 1938 agreement replaced an earlier, 1935 agreement between the same parties, which
prohibited “arbitrary discrimination by either country against the other country in favor of any
third country where similar conditions prevail.”84 The express reference to “like articles” dis-
appeared a decade later in another agreement binding on these parties—namely,GATT1947.
Sometimes in these situations, a change inwording canbe significant,85 but it is submitted that,
given the back-and-forth of the wording in these provisions, the language in the 1938 agree-
mentwasmeant as a clarificationof thewording in the1935agreement, rather than as a change,
and that “like articles” indicates how the corresponding phrase in the chapeau of the general
exceptions in GATT 1994 and GATS should be understood.
There is, of course,more to a discrimination analysis than the basic idea that it involves com-
petitive products in a marketplace. And while EC––Seal Products recognized a similarity
between the discrimination analyses under the substantive nondiscrimination provisions in
GATT 1994 and under the chapeau, significant room for variation remains. For example, it
would be possible to emphasize different elements in determining whether products are com-
petitive or to come to a different conclusion on whether the disparate impact must be under-
stood in terms of a single product or a group of products.86 On the facts of any given case, it
is also possible to apply the chapeau’s discrimination test to a set of competitive products that
has not yet been analyzed under any substantive rules.87 No a priori reason requires, however,
82 InChina—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum,WT/DS431/R,para.
7.657 (adoptedAug. 14, 2014) [hereinafter PanelReport,China—RareEarths], the panel determined thatChinese
export duties discriminated between exported andnon-exportedChinese “like” products. This determinationmust
be incorrect.On its own terms the chapeau does not prohibit discrimination between products from the same coun-
try. More plausibly, the panel might have analyzed the measure in terms of discrimination between Chinese and
foreign downstream products using the rawmaterials as inputs. It did actually take this approach in the (different)
context of China’s export quotas, id., paras. 7.833, .959, albeit with metonymic references to “consumers” and
“users.”
83 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Art. XII(2), Nov. 17, 1938, 53 Stat. 2348 (emphasis added). In
U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 25 n.46, the Appellate Body referred to a 1927multilateral treaty and a 1935 bilat-
eral treaty between the same parties and noted that “[t]hese earlier treaties are here noted, not as pertaining to the
travaux preparatoires of the General Agreement, but simply to show how in comparable treaties, a particular intent
was expressed with words not found in printer’s ink in the General Agreement.”
84 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Art. XII, Nov. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3960.
85 In U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 24 n.46, the Appellate Body contrasted the language of the same 1935
agreement (discrimination in favor of “any third country”) with the wording of GATT 1947 (“countries”) to con-
clude that, as opposed to the earlier wording, the latter wording was not limited to third countries.
86 On the latter issue, see Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law: National and Most
Favoured Nation Treatment—or Equal Treatment, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 921 (2002).
87 See also infra text accompanying note 126.
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the adoption of tests different from those applied under the substantive obligations. In par-
ticular, there is no reason to take into account a measure’s regulatory purpose in determining
whether the measure is discriminatory under the chapeau. The reason, it is submitted, is that
the chapeau already contains two policy-based justifications for any such discrimination.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS
“Countries Where the Same Conditions Prevail”
It is sometimes underemphasized that the chapeau does not prohibit discrimination
between all competitive products but only discrimination between those products that orig-
inate in “countries where the same conditions prevail.”88 This phrase can be seen as excluding
the application of the chapeau’s discrimination test to measures with a disparate impact on
products of certain origins (that is, otherwise discriminatory measures) if the disparate impact
has a rational relationship to the measure’s objective. Put another way, this phrase permits the
objective of a measure to justify any rationally related disparate effects. The next section will
consider the way in which measures that cannot be justified on that basis can nonetheless be
justified on other grounds.
This interpretation depends on using the objective of the measure at issue as a means of
determining the “conditions” prevailing in the respective countries. EC—Seal Products pro-
vides support for this approach; the Appellate Body said that “ ‘conditions’ relating to the par-
ticular policy objective under the applicable subparagraph are relevant for the analysis under
the chapeau.”89 To date, however, it has never been found that “conditions” were not the same
in different countries, which leaves this scenario somewhat underexplored.
A convenient way of understanding the “conditions” prevailing in different countries is in
terms of the risks that the measure at issue is designed to address. Accordingly, for a measure
prohibiting imports of products produced by prison labor, “conditions” would be the same in
countries where products are, to the same degree, produced by prison labor, but they would
be different in countries where products are not produced by prison labor to the same degree.
It is only in the first of these two scenarios that the chapeau permits a discrimination analysis.
For countries where conditions are not relevantly the same, the objective of the measure oper-
ates to justify any disparate impact between products from those countries. It might also be
suggested that these “conditions” shouldbedefined in termsofnot only themeasure’s objective
but also the degree to which thatmeasure achieves its objective. This broader definition would
allow for a calibration between the “conditions” prevailing in the relevant countries and the
extent to which the measure addresses those conditions.
It is appropriate, if perhaps challenging, to consider the facts ofU.S.—Shrimp in light of this
approach.90 The starting point would be to identify, based on the measure’s objective, the rel-
evant “conditions.”As the objective of themeasure inU.S.—Shrimpwas toprotect endangered
88 One may contrast this phrase with, for example, “any other country” under the most-favored-nation obliga-
tions in Article I:1 of GATT 1994, supra note 1, and Article II.1 of GATS, supra note 1.
89 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 12, paras. 5.300, .317; see also Gaines, supra note 39,
at 779; Julia Qin, Defining Nondiscrimination Under the Law of the World Trade Organization 23 B.U. INT’L L.J.
215, 264 (2005).
90 For a similar analysis, see Gaines, supra note 39, at 779.
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sea turtles, the relevant “conditions” prevailing in the countries at issue would depend on the
endangered status of sea turtles in those countries.On such ananalysis, theUnitedStateswould
be able to prohibit imports of shrimp from countries where sea turtles are endangered but not
from countries where sea turtles are not endangered.
A series of questions follows. The first is whether it matters how “conditions” in the respec-
tive countries have come to be as they are. Should it matter, for example, that one country has
taken steps, of whatever kind, to protect and even breed sea turtles, or that another country has
no sea turtles in the first place? Arguably, the answer to this question is no: what matters are
the “conditions prevailing” on the date on which the measure at issue was adopted.91 In par-
ticular, it should be irrelevantwhether a given country adopted one type ofmeasure as opposed
to another type ofmeasure. But what if, on that “critical date,” the country in which sea turtles
are not endangered—and that therefore benefits from favorable treatment—was in that situ-
ation only as a result of conduct attributable to the respondent country? Should that make a
difference?That situation arose inU.S.—Shrimp, inwhich theUnited States had assisted some
exporters, but not others, to meet its requirements, and as a result of that assistance, sea turtles
were less endangered in those countries.
There are several ways of addressing such a situation. One is to consider the respondent’s
facilitative acts the “measure” at issue. It is not certain that such a measure would violate the
substantive GATT 1994 or GATS nondiscrimination obligations,92 at least when the facili-
tative acts take place beyond the ordinary territorial jurisdictionof the respondent country.But
even in the absence of such a violation, trade-facilitative acts of this nature might undermine
benefits accruing directly or indirectly to aWTOmember under those agreements.93 Prior to
the entry into force of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in 1995,94
such “nonviolation” claimsweremainly usedunderGATT1947 as a remedy for domestic sub-
sidies that undermined tariff concessions. But “nonviolation” claims have also been successful
in certain other situations. In EC––Citrus Products, a GATT panel determined that the Euro-
pean Community had impaired the benefit accruing to the United States directly or indirectly
under the GATT most-favored-nation obligation, insofar as it granted discriminatory tariff
preferences to products from third countries on which concessions had been granted.95More-
over, in U.S.––COOL (Article 21.5), aWTOpanel determined that a discriminatory labeling
regulation impaired the benefits accruing to aWTOmember in respect of products on which
91 SeeAppellate BodyReport,U.S.—Tuna II, supranote 53, para. 297. Another implication is that it is irrelevant
that aWTOmembermight be able to take steps reduce the incidence of harm after themeasure is adopted.SeePanel
Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products
(Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico), paras. 7.448–.450, WT/DS381/RW (Apr. 14, 2015; under
appeal).
92 See Qin, supra note 89, at 257 n.173.
93 See Article XXIII:1(b) of GATT1994, supra note 1, read together with Article 26.1 of theDispute Settlement
Understanding, supra note 19. See also GATS, supra note 1, Art. XXIII.3. “Nonviolation” claims are subject to cer-
tain other conditions, recently discussed in Panel Report, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico), paras. 7.673–.716, WT/
DS384/RW (adopted, as modified, May 29, 2015).
94 Agreement on Subsidies andCountervailingMeasures, Apr. 15, 1994,WTOAgreement, supranote 1, Annex
1A, 1869 UNTS 14.
95 GATTPanel Report, EuropeanCommunity––Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products fromCertain
Countries in the Mediterranean Region, paras. 4.36, 5.1, L/5776 (Feb. 7, 1985).
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that member was entitled to trade concessions.96 Neither finding has legal weight, the first
because the panel report was not adopted, and the second because it wasmade arguendo for the
purpose of assisting the Appellate Body in the event that the Appellate Body overturned the
panel’s other findings (which did not occur).97Nonetheless, these findings show that the range
of “measures” supporting a “nonviolation” claimmight include trade-facilitativemeasures that
negatively affect the conditions of competition for products on which concessions have been
made.
But can the general exceptions toGATT1994orGATSapply to such a “nonviolation”mea-
sure? It is submitted that the answer to this question should be in the affirmative. Both of these
provisions contain the phrase “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement . . . of [certain] measures.” WTO members adopting a “nonviola-
tion” measure are obligated to make a “mutually satisfactory adjustment” in relation to any
affectedWTOmember.98 Although the question has not been much discussed, it is arguable
that the existence of such an obligation “prevent[s]”WTOmembers from adopting suchmea-
sures.99
Assuming, then, that an extraterritorial facilitativemeasure could be justified under the gen-
eral exceptions, the next questionswould bewhether thatmeasurewas adopted for a legitimate
objective under one of the subparagraphs and, if so, whether it meets any other relevant con-
ditions. If the measure survives all of these conditions, the question would then arise whether,
based on the objective of the measure, the same “conditions” prevail between the countries at
issue.On these assumptions, the same“conditions”would indeedprevail, as these “conditions”
are those that existedon thedate of themeasure’s adoption. Inevitably, therewouldbe afinding
of discrimination, atwhich stage the respondentwould be required to justify its discriminatory
measures on separate grounds. That might be difficult.100
A simpler alternative might be to discount any conduct attributable to the respondent that
contributed to the currently prevailing “conditions,” and to treat those “conditions,” instead,
as theywouldhavebeen in the absenceof that conduct.On the facts ofU.S.––Shrimp, the result
of such an approachwouldbe that, for countrieswhere sea turtles are not endangered, the “con-
ditions” prevailing would be determined prior to receiving U.S. assistance. The “conditions”
prevailing in the complaining countries, where sea turtles are endangered, would then be the
“same” as in those other countries, and a discrimination analysis could proceed.
96 PanelReport,United States—CertainCountry ofOriginLabelling (COOL)Requirements (Recourse toArti-
cle 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico), supra note 93, para. 7.716.
97 Id., para 7.672.
98 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 19, Art. 26.1; GATS, supra note 1, Art. XXIII.3.
99 In European Communities––Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, para. 191,
WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001), the Appellate Body held, conversely, that a measure that was justified
by Article XX of GATT could be the subject of a “nonviolation” claim. The relevance of the phrase “nothing shall
prevent” inArticle XXofGATT1994, supranote 1, was not considered. It is submitted that this phrase should have
been considered and that, if it had been considered, the result would have been the opposite.
100 InU.S.––Shrimp itself, theUnited States offered only a single justification for one of themany discriminatory
aspects of its trade-facilitative acts—namely, that the difference in time periods granted to different countries to
phase in the use of special technology was justified “by the then undeveloped character of [turtle excluder device]
technology, while the shorter period was later made possible by the improvements in that technology.” Appellate
Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 174. This argument was rejected on the facts. Id.
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These options are speculative, and they concernwhat is admittedly anunusual fact situation.
The first of these options may even lead to the conclusion that a discriminatory trade-facili-
tative measure does not violate a relevant substantive nondiscrimination obligation in GATT
1994 orGATS, and perhaps also that it does not support a nonviolation complaint. But if that
is the case, it is also difficult to see why such a measure should fail to meet the discrimination
test in the chapeau of the general exceptions. In any case, it is submitted that these options are
an improvement on the Appellate Body’s actual approach, when it said, famously, that there
could be discrimination “not onlywhen countries inwhich the same conditions prevail are dif-
ferently treated, but also when the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any
inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in
those exporting countries.”101
This statement presents several problems. By the language used, it appears to mean that the
chapeau prohibits discrimination evenwhen the “conditions” prevailing in different countries
are not the same. It is obvious, however, that this interpretation cannot be valid, for it would
violate the text of the chapeau.102 This statement is also strange in another way. Whether or
not “conditions prevailing” are the “same” is an objective question of fact, which is relevant in
determining whether a discrimination test under the chapeau is applicable. It is irrelevant
whether theUnited Statesmade any effort to determine that fact, and equally, it cannot be said
that the United States was under an obligation to determine that fact.
Julia Qin has suggested a different interpretation of the Appellate Body’s statement, which
is to treat it as suggesting the availability of an alternative, less discriminatorymeasure, one that
would have enabled the United States to achieve its objectives.103 But to read this statement
in the context of a “necessity” test, it would need to be assumed that the Appellate Body had
already accepted not only that theU.S.measure discriminated against products from countries
in which the relevant “conditions” were the same but also that these discriminatory effects
were, at least potentially, in pursuit of a legitimate objective. That is unlikely to have been the
case. As noted, the language used by the Appellate Body indicates that it did not think that the
“conditions prevailing”were the same, and it also rejected the only justification that theUnited
States offered for its discriminatory trade-facilitative measure.104
Given these difficulties with the Appellate Body’s attempt to grapple with what is, admit-
tedly, a difficult problem, it is suggested that a fidelity to the text of the chapeau is at least a good
place to start in finding a more plausible solution.
Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination
Even if ameasure produces disparate effects that are not rationally related to its objective and
that are then found to be discriminatory under the chapeau, the party adopting such ameasure
101 Id., para. 165; see also Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia), supra note 34, para.
149.
102 Gaines, supra note 39, at 784–85. Even supporters of the Appellate Body’s ruling have accepted that this
interpretation contradicts the text of the chapeau. See, e.g., DonaldMcRae, GATT Article XX and the W TO Appel-
late Body, inNEWDIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONALECONOMICLAW230 (MarcoBronckers&ReinhardQuick
eds., 2000).
103 See Qin, supra note 89, at 269.
104 See supra note 100.
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has another chance to justify such effects, because the chapeau prohibits discrimination only
when it is “arbitrary or unjustifiable.” What that means, however, is still uncertain.
In U.S.—Shrimp, the Appellate Body said the following:
The policy goal of a measure at issue cannot provide its rationale or justification
under the standards of the chapeau of Article XX. The legitimacy of the declared policy
objective of the measure, and the relationship of that objective with the measure itself
and its general design and structure, are examined under Article XX(g), and the treaty
interpreter may then and there declare the measure inconsistent with Article XX(g).
If the measure is not held provisionally justified under Article XX(g), it cannot be ulti-
mately justified under the chapeau of Article XX.105
This statement has beenmuch criticized. SanfordGaines said that it “is absurdly redundant
for the Appellate Body to point out that measures that do not ‘provisionally qualify under one
of the paragraphs’ cannot ‘ultimately’ meet the Article XX qualifications by reference to the
chapeau.”106 It is difficult to fault this assessment, and inBrazil—Retreaded Tyres theAppellate
Body revised its approach. It now said that the “Appellate Body Reports in US—Gasoline,
US—Shrimp, andUS—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia) show that the analysis of whether the
application of ameasure results in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination should focus on the
cause of the discrimination, or the rationale put forward to existence.”107This statementmakes
intuitive sense. In determining whether a discriminatory measure can be justified, it seems
proper to take into account any rationale offered by the party responsible for the discrimina-
tion. The Appellate Body then limited the range of acceptable rationales, however, saying that
the discrimination would be arbitrary or unjustifiable if the “reasons given for this discrimi-
nation bear no rational connection to the objective falling within the purview of a paragraph
of Article XX, or would go against that objective.”108
Both parts of this statement are problematic. The first problem is that, asmentioned, amea-
sure’s objective is already taken into account in determining whether “conditions prevailing”
are the “same” in affected countries. In relation to products originating in countrieswhere con-
ditions are not the “same,” a measure may have a disparate impact. It follows that a finding of
discrimination under the chapeau can be found only when the measure’s objective does not
justify such disparate impact. Consequently, for the term “arbitrary or unjustifiable” to have
anymeaning, it must refer to something that is logically distinct from the measure’s objective.
There may be a connection between the rationale for the discrimination and the objective of
the measure, but any such connection is no more than coincidental.
The second problem concerns the Appellate Body’s assertion that the rationale used to jus-
tify discrimination cannot “go against” a measure’s objective. The problem here is that, when
a measure’s discriminatory effect results from an exception to that measure, the rationale for
that exception, and hence for the discrimination, not only will differ from but will often nec-
essarily contradict the measure’s objective. In Brazil—Retreaded Tyres it was not disputed that
105 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 149.
106 Gaines, supra note 39, at 777.
107 Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, supra note 11, para. 226.
108 Id., para. 227.
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the measure discriminated against retreaded tires from the European Union, which were pro-
hibited, because themeasure did not prohibit retreaded tires fromMERCOSUR countries.109 It
is difficult to understandwhy theAppellate Body refused even to considerwhether the rationale
for this discrimination—namely, Brazil’s ongoing membership in MERCOSUR, which Brazil
had joined pursuant to its right, set out in Article XXIV of GATT 1994, to form a customs
union—might have been justified (even if, on the facts, the Appellate Body may have rejected
this reason for discriminating against the European Union).
The Appellate Body displayedmore cautionwhen a similarmeasure came before it inEC—
Seal Products. That dispute concerned anEUprohibitionon the sale of seal products, for public
morals reasons. Themeasure contained several exceptions, among which was an exception for
seal products derived from indigenous hunts—an exception that was designed to protect the
interests of indigenous hunters.110 The panel had found that allowing the importation of seal
products derived from indigenous hunts clearly “went against” themeasure’s objective;111 that
objective and the exception’s rationale were in direct conflict.
In dealing with this issue, the Appellate Body began by refining its statement in Brazil––
Retreaded Tyres. It said that
the relationship of the discrimination to the objective of a measure is one of the most
important factors, but not the sole test, that is relevant to the assessment of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination. In other words, depending on the nature of the measure at
issue and the circumstances of the case at hand, there could be additional factors that may
also be relevant to that overall assessment.112
Inwhat followed, however, theAppellateBodydisplayed a certain ambivalence in its approach.
On the one hand, the Appellate Body considered the extent towhich themeasure actually sup-
ported subsistence hunting by Inuit communities.113 This inquiry would have precluded by
the approach followed in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres. On the other hand, however, the Appellate
Body faulted the European Union for “fail[ing] to demonstrate . . . how the discrimination
resulting from the manner in which the EU Seal Regime treats [indigenous communities’]
hunts as compared to ‘commercial’ hunts can be reconciled with, or is related to, the policy
objective of addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare.”114 This statement
harks back to the original test in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres.
This ambivalence is regrettable. For the reasons mentioned, it is suggested both that the
Appellate Body was right to consider that the protection of indigenous interests could justify
discrimination under the chapeau, even if, as had been established, this justification “went
109 Id., para. 3.
110 See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal
Products, supra note 53, para. 7.261 n.419, citing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA
Res. 61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), as well as the International LabourOrganizationConvention (No. 169) Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, at http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/
Conventions/no169/lang–en/index.htm, and the Charter of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (1980), at http://
www.inuitcircumpolar.com/charter–bylaws.html.
111 Panel Report, EuropeanCommunities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation andMarketing of Seal Prod-
ucts, supranote 53, para 7.275.TheAppellate Body accepted this finding inEC—Seal Products, supranote 12, para.
5.320 n.1559.
112 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 12, para. 5.321; see also id., para. 5.306.
113 Id., paras. 5.321–.326.
114 Id., para. 5.320; see id., para. 5.338.
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against” themeasure’s objective, and that the Appellate Bodywas wrongwhen, inconsistently,
it required this justification to be “related to” that objective.
Identifying Legitimate Justifications Under the Chapeau
A logically separate question is how to identify the set of rationales that can justify discrim-
inationunder the chapeau.The chapeau’s text leaves this issue entirely open,with the following
interpretive options, among others. First, discrimination could be justified only for one of the
reasons set out in the subparagraphs, even if the reason for such discrimination differs from the
reason for the measure itself. Second, discrimination could be justified on grounds recognized
elsewhere in the agreement at issue or otherWTO agreements. Discriminationmight accord-
ingly be justified in terms of the right to form a regional trade agreement or the right to dis-
criminate, in certain respects, in favor of developing countries. Third, discrimination could be
justified for reasons recognized in international standards.TheAppellateBody took something
like this position in EC—Tariff Preferences when it said that a developing country’s “needs” in
relation to the WTO Enabling Clause115 are to be assessed according to objective standards
for which “[b]road-based recognition of a particular need, set out in the W TO Agreement or
in multilateral instruments adopted by international organizations, could serve.”116 Fourth,
but less likely, the Appellate Body might recognize legitimate objectives without reference to
other normative considerations.117
It is difficult to predictwhich of the above approaches, if any,might be adopted. It is perhaps
relevant, however, that in EC––Seal Products (as noted above), the Appellate Body seems to
have accepted that the protection of indigenous interests might constitute a legitimate reason
for discrimination, even if it also, and inconsistently, required this objective to “relate” to the
public morals objective of the measure itself.
Discrimination “Necessary” to Achieve a Legitimate Objective
Even if uncertainty remains as to the particular legitimate objectives that can justify discrim-
inationunder the chapeau, existing jurisprudence on the chapeau indicates that discrimination
can be justified only if it is “necessary” to achieve such an objective.118 This means that there
must be no other measure, reasonably available to the regulating party, that achieves its objec-
tives in a less discriminatory manner. In U.S.—Gasoline, for example, the Appellate Body
115 See supra note 62.
116 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, para. 163, WT/DS246/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2004).
117 SeeAppellateBodyReport,United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, para.
225, WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 24, 2012), concerning “legitimate regulatory distinctions” in the TBT
Agreement, supranote 53, Art. 2.1. TheUnited States had argued that prohibiting clove cigarettes, but notmenthol
cigarettes, was justified in order to minimize the health care costs of responding to withdrawal symptoms of “mil-
lions” ofmenthol cigarette smokers and tominimize the risk of a blackmarket inmenthol cigarettes. The Appellate
Body, not persuaded that these risks would materialize, noted, in effect, that addicted smokers could still smoke
regular cigarettes. What is important is that the Appellate Body accepted, at least arguendo, that the United States
might have had justifiable reasons for discriminating that had nothing to do with the objective of themeasure, even
if it then rejected any causal link between the measure and those reasons.
118 See Qin, supra note 89, at 267–69.
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thought that the United States could have achieved its objectives by cooperating with Vene-
zuela and Venezuelan producers—which, it believed, would have led to a less discriminatory
outcome.119 InU.S.––Shrimp, the Appellate Body considered a range of alternative U.S. mea-
sures that, it believed, would have led to a less discriminatory outcome while achieving the
country’s environmental objectives. For reasonsmentioned, it is suggested that these objectives
should not have been considered at this stage. Nonetheless, setting aside that problem, what
is important is that the Appellate Body considered a range of alternative, less discriminatory
measures that might have been adopted by the United States. These alternative measures
included taking into account the policies and measures adopted by the countries in which the
affected products originated, taking into account of the actual conditions prevailing in those
countries, and negotiating with them.120
Certain other anomalous findings inEC—Seal Products can also be explained in these terms.
The Appellate Body focused on two issues that were, in its reasoning, independent of its prior
determination that the European Union had discriminated against Canadian and Norwegian
seal products.Onewas that the EuropeanUnion had facilitatedmarket access for seal products
derived fromGreenland indigenous hunts but had notmade “comparable efforts” to facilitate
market access for seal products derived fromCanadian indigenous hunts.121 Another was that,
due to ambiguities in the measure at issue, “seal products derived from what should in fact be
properly characterized as ‘commercial’ hunts could . . . enter the EUmarket under the [indig-
enous communities] exception in some instances.”122
It is suggested that the properway to dealwith both of these issueswould have been to accept
the finding of discrimination against Canadian and Norwegian seal products, and then to
determine whether this discrimination could be justified either on the ground that, seen in
terms of public morals, different “conditions” prevailed or on the alternative ground that the
discrimination was “necessary” to protect indigenous interests. In the event, the Appellate
Body established that according to the measure’s rationale, “conditions” between all relevant
countries were the same.123 It thereby disposed of the first of the two possibilities for justifying
the discriminatory aspects of the measure.
But what about the second justification—namely, whether discrimination against Cana-
dian and Norwegian seal products was justified on the ground of protecting indigenous inter-
ests? As noted, it seems that the Appellate Body implicitly accepted the European Union’s
objective of protecting indigenous interests as legitimate (or else it would have disposed of the
case at this early stage, as it did in Brazil––Retreaded Tyres). On the approach suggested here,
the question would have been whether any alternative measures reasonably available to the
EuropeanUnion would have achieved its objectives of protecting indigenous interests in a less
discriminatorymanner. Accordingly, it might have been established that the EuropeanUnion
could have made “comparable efforts” to facilitate market access for seal products deriving
119 E.g., Appellate BodyReport, U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 26–27.Here, as elsewhere, the Appellate Body
assumed that negotiations would likely have led to a less discriminatory result. See the Appellate Body’s discussions
in U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, U.S.—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia), supra note 34, and EC—Seal Products,
supra note 12, para. 5.337. The Appellate Body came to the opposite conclusion, however, in U.S.—Gambling,
supra note 10, para. 317, in the context of a “necessity” test under GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. XX(a).
120 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, paras. 163, 165, 166, 171.
121 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 12, para. 5.337.
122 Id., para. 5.326; see also id., para. 5.328.
123 Id., para. 5.317.
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from Canadian Inuit hunts and could have ensured that all seal products deriving from hunts
properly characterized as “commercial” were prohibited. Both amendments would have been
less discriminatory than the measure actually adopted.
It is notable that the first of these amendments would have been less trade restrictive than
the measure at issue, and that the second of these amendments would have been more trade
restrictive than themeasure at issue. But that does notmatter. InU.S.—Gasoline, theAppellate
Body suggested that the United States could have imposed “[higher] statutory baselines with-
out differentiation as between domestic and imported gasoline.”124 Under the chapeau, what
is important is the justification of the measure’s discriminatory aspects. That justification, if
made out, overrides the trade interests of affected WTO members.
The analysis above can be understood as a reconstruction—that is, as an effort to use the
AppellateBody’s findings inEC—Seal Products to answer the questionwhether discrimination
against Canadian andNorwegian seal products was “necessary.” In reality, the Appellate Body
approached the matter quite differently. As to the first issue—namely, that the European
Union had not made “comparable efforts” to facilitate imports of Canadian Inuit seal prod-
ucts—the Appellate Body presented a discrimination analysis involving new comparators, the
seal products resulting from Inuit hunts inGreenland andCanada, respectively. Thus, itmade
a finding that
to the extent that the [indigenous communities] exception is designed and applied so as
to be de facto only available to Greenland, the EU Seal Regime would treat seal products
derived from [indigenous communities’] hunts inGreenland andCanada differently and,
in this respect, result in discrimination between countries where the same conditions pre-
vail.125
The chapeau does not expressly state that the comparators that are relevant for its discrim-
ination testmust be the same as those that produced the violation that is in needof justification.
But ignoring those comparators at this later stage breaks the connection with the fundamental
issue at stake, which is whether a measure’s discriminatory effects, insofar as they affect prod-
ucts from countries in which the “same conditions prevail,” can be justified on policy
grounds.126
TheAppellateBody’s analysis of the second issue—namely, that theEuropeanUnionmight
yet admit seal products from hunts properly characterized as “commercial”—is also unsatis-
factory. It said:
Given the ambiguities in the criteria of the [indigenous communities] exception and the
broad discretion that the recognized bodies consequently enjoy in applying these criteria,
we consider that seal products derived from what should in fact be properly characterized
124 See Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 25.
125 Appellate BodyReport, EC—Seal Products, supranote 12, para. 5.333. Earlier, id., para 5.316, the Appellate
Body had said that “we will analyze whether the measure has any discriminatory effects on different indigenous
communities.” This language should be treated as metonymic. On no reading of the chapeau is GATT 1994 con-
cerned with discrimination between indigenous communities per se.
126 Likewise, the Appellate Body’s references to “even-handedness” in applying a “legitimate regulatory distinc-
tion” under the TBT Agreement, supra note 53, Art. 2.1, might be understood in terms of the “necessity” of the
measure’s discriminatory effects for achieving a legitimate objective. See Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Tuna II,
supra note 53, para. 216.
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as “commercial” hunts could potentially enter the EUmarket under the [indigenous com-
munities] exception. Thus, pursuant to its design, the EU Seal Regime could be applied
in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail.127
In this context the Appellate Body cited U.S.––Shrimp, where it had determined that the
“casual” application of theU.S.measure in that case constituted “arbitrary discrimination.”128
The Appellate Body made no attempt in that paragraph, however, to explain why the admis-
sion of “commercially hunted” seal products was discriminatory, nor whether any such dis-
crimination might be justified. This lack of reasoning, it is submitted, strengthens the case for
asking, instead, whether this aspect of the European Union’s measure was “necessary” to its
objective of protecting indigenous interests.
In another respect, however, EC––Seal Products made a valuable contribution to the tests
relevant to the justification of discriminatory measures under the chapeau. It said that
the European Union has not established . . . why the need to protect the economic and
social interests of the Inuit and other indigenous peoples necessarily implies that the Euro-
pean Union cannot do anything further to ensure that the welfare of seals is addressed in
the context of [indigenous communities’] hunts, given that “[indigenous communities’]
hunts can cause the very pain and suffering for seals that the EU public is concerned
about.”129
The Appellate Body seems here to have been requiring the EuropeanUnion to demonstrate
that no alternative measure would achieve the European Union’s objectives of protecting
indigenous interests while being less harmful to the objective of the measure itself. With one
caveat, this test seems reasonable. A reasonably available alternative measure may be both less
discriminatory than the measure at issue and less inconsistent with that measure’s objective.
It is not clear, however,why the burdenof identifying such ameasure shouldbe on theEuro-
pean Union. In the context of the “necessity” test in the subparagraphs of the general excep-
tions, it is well established that the initial burden of identifying such measures lies with the
complainant.130 It is suggested, likewise, that the burden of identifying an alternative, less dis-
criminatory measure under the chapeau should also rest with the complainant. On the facts
of EC—Seal Products, it was unlikely that any alternative measure could have protected both
public morals and indigenous interests. This situation illustrates why it is important that the
complainant bear the burden of identifying an alternative measure.
Arbitrary Discrimination
To date, the Appellate Body has generally refrained from drawing any significant distinc-
tions between arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.131 In U.S.—Shrimp the Appellate
Body said that the “standards of the chapeau . . . project both substantive and procedural
127 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 12, para. 5.328.
128 Id. (citing Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 181).
129 Id., para. 5.520.
130 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gambling, supra note 10, para. 309.
131 In Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, supra note 11, para. 232, the Appellate Body considered
thatBrazil’s rationale for discriminationwas arbitrary because it didnot relate to themeasure’s purpose, and it found
the rationale unjustified for the same reason.
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requirements.”132 Applying this test, it held that the U.S. measure involved arbitrary discrim-
ination because of the rigidity of the U.S. certification process and certain due process
defects.133 In EC––Seal Products, as mentioned above,134 the Appellate Body determined that
the EuropeanUnion’s measure constituted “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”—with-
out differentiating between “arbitrary” and “unjustifiable”—because itwas likely to be applied
in an uncertain manner.
In other cases, however, the Appellate Body has refrained from treating “arbitrary discrim-
ination” in procedural terms. And even when it has done so, its focus has remained on the dis-
criminatory effects of procedural irregularities. For example, in discussing the United States’
failure to negotiate in U.S.—Shrimp, the Appellate Body was careful to phrase its actual find-
ings in terms of the discriminatory effects of that omission.135 The Appellate Body did much
the same inU.S.—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia), when it concluded that “[s]o long as such
comparable efforts aremade, it ismore likely that ‘arbitrary orunjustifiable discrimination’will
be avoided between countries where an importingMember concludes an agreement with one
group of countries, but fails to do so with another group of countries.”136
The Appellate Body’s ambivalent approach to the interpretation of “arbitrary discrimina-
tion” in terms of due process is understandable. First, as Gaines has pointed out, even arbitrary
decision making does not necessarily imply an economically discriminatory result,137 and
according to the text of the chapeau, it is just such a result that is relevant. Second, treating
arbitrary discrimination in terms of due process is at odds with the historical background to
the chapeau. In many trade agreements, both prior and subsequent to GATT 1947, the stan-
dard wording for chapeau conditions has been “arbitrary discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail.”138 Indeed, an early draft of the chapeau of Article XX of
GATT1947was the same, referring tomeasures “not applied in such amanner as to constitute
a means of arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade.”139 The word “unjustifiable” was added at some
later point in the drafting process.
That history has important implications for the interpretationof “arbitrary” discrimination.
In its original context, it is clear that this concept refers to conduct having no proper purpose.
132 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 9, para. 160.
133 Id., paras. 177–181. The Appellate Body added that the practice of U.S. administrative authorities was “con-
trary to the spirit, if not the letter, of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994,” which provides for the transparent admin-
istration of domestic laws and regulations. Id., para. 183. If one reads “if not” in this phrase as inclusive rather than
exclusive (see “If Not,” ECONOMIST (Oct. 23, 2012), at http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2012/10/
ambiguity), this ruling was arguably non ultra petita, as none of the parties had raised this obligation at any stage
in the proceedings.
134 See supra text accompanying note 127.
135 Id., para. 172.The samepoint ismade inRobertHowse,The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case:
A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVT’L. L. 491, 507–09 (2002).
136 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia), supra note 34, para. 122.
137 Gaines, supra note 39, at 825.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 83–85; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, Art. 36, May 9, 2008, 2008 OJ (C 115) 47; infra note 139 and accompanying text.
139 Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, Committee II, Tech-
nical Sub-committee, at 7, UN Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/50 (Nov. 13, 1946); Preparatory Committee of the Interna-
tional Conference on Trade and Employment, Committee II, Report of the Technical Sub-committee, at 36, UN
Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54/Rev.1 (Nov. 28, 1946).
122 [Vol. 109:95THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Indeed, as noted above,140 that is how “arbitrary” is understood in the context of the doctrine
of abuse of rights. But such an interpretation generates an obvious, and potentially problem-
atic, overlap with the word “unjustifiable.” There is a solution, however, that makes sense of
both words: “arbitrary” discrimination could refer to discrimination for which no rationale is
offered,whereas “unjustifiable”discrimination could refer todiscrimination forwhich thepro-
posed rationale either is illegitimate or does not justify the measure that has been adopted.
V. DISGUISED RESTRICTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The secondof the conditions in the chapeau requires that ameasure not be applied in aman-
ner that constitutes a “disguised restrictionon international trade.” It is suggested that this con-
dition applies tomeasures for which an ostensibly legitimate purpose is merely a “disguise” for
an improper purpose;141 in other words,measures that are adopted for amixture of proper and
improper purposes142—which, as discussed above, would be a classic example of the abuse of
the right to adopt measures for legitimate reasons.143
There is a special need for a rule governing suchmeasures, because, unlikemeasures that are
adopted for no legitimate purpose,144 the legitimate purposes of measures adopted for mixed
legitimate and illegitimate purposes may enable the measures to be justified under one of the
subparagraphs. It is also appropriate that such a condition be located in the chapeau, because
it is horizontally applicable to all measures presented for justification under the general excep-
tions.
If this interpretation is accepted, then a further question arises: should a rule prohibiting
“disguised restrictions on international trade” include onlymeasures with a sole or primary ille-
gitimate purpose or should it also include, more broadly, measures with any illegitimate pur-
pose, even if the illegitimate purpose isminor compared to the legitimate purpose? The second
of these options would be significantly more restrictive of regulatory autonomy. Given the
prevalence of measures that seek to achieve public policy goals, such as environmental protec-
tion, but that also have the purpose of protecting domestic industry, this condition may yet
prove to be one of the more important aspects of the chapeau.
140 See supra text accompanying note 47.
141 Panel Report, China—Rare Earths, supra note 82, para. 7.343 (argument made by China). In the context of
theWTO, an improper reason would arguably be ameasure to protect domestic industry, but there could be other
reasons, such as corruption. See Lalanne & Ledour (Fr. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 17 (Fr.-Venez. Mixed Cl. Comm’n
1903–05).
142 An alternative, but less compelling, interpretation is that this condition relates to measures that are not pub-
lished. InU.S.—Gasoline, supra note 8, at 24, the Appellate Body said that “disguised” restrictions were not limited
to those that were “concealed or unannounced.” In Panel Report, EC—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products
Containing Asbestos, para. 8.234, WT/DS135/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001), the panel interpreted this statement as
meaning that “a measure that was not published would not satisfy the requirements of the second proposition of
the introductory clause of Article XX.” The same panel also said, however, id., para 8.236, that “a restriction which
formallymeets the requirements ofArticleXX(b)will constitute an abuse if such compliance is in fact only a disguise
to conceal the pursuit of trade-restrictive objectives.” This view aligns with the interpretation proposed here. By
contrast, in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, supra note 81, para. 7.349, the panel found a “disguised” restriction on trade
even though the respondent had not adopted the measure for an improper purpose, and in China—Rare Earths,
supra note 82, para. 7.625, the panel found that “a situation of discrimination that is not justified constitutes a dis-
guised restriction on trade.”
143 See supra text accompanying note 46.
144 E.g., Panel Report, China—Rare Earths, supra note 82, paras. 7.168–.169, 7.191–.193.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article argues that the Appellate Body hasmisunderstood the chapeau and that, in par-
ticular, there is no analytic, structural, or even thematic difference between the conditions in
the chapeau and those in the subparagraphs of the general exceptions. The primary reason is
that all of the conditions in the general exceptions function to limit the right of aWTOmem-
ber to adopt certain measures. In this broad sense, all of these conditions are directed against
“abuses” of the right to adopt measures for legitimate reasons under the general exceptions. As
to why some conditions are located in the subparagraphs and others in the chapeau, the expla-
nation is mundane: some of these conditions are specific to certain types of measures, whereas
others apply horizontally to all of the measures that can be adopted under the general excep-
tions. It also follows that, in principle, the order in which the application of these several con-
ditions is to be analyzed should be dictated solely by the requirements of judicial economy.
With regard to the conditions in the chapeau, this article makes several points. It first
argues that a measure’s discriminatory effects, if any, are to be assessed exclusively under
the chapeau, and not the subparagraphs. It agrees with the Appellate Body in EC—Seal
Products that the discrimination test in the chapeau is concerned with competitive prod-
ucts and that this test can be considered similar–– even identical––to the discrimination
tests in the substantive obligations in the agreements. Moreover, but now contrary to
EC––Seal Products, it argues that the comparators for any discrimination analysis under
the chapeau should, where possible, be the same as those that are relevant under the sub-
stantive obligations. It would have been appropriate for the Appellate Body to consider
whether, under the chapeau, the European Union had discriminated between seal prod-
ucts from Canada and Greenland, respectively, rather than whether it had discriminated
between indigenously hunted seal products from those same countries.
Next, this article proposes that structurally, there are two independent justifications for
measures with disparate effects. In relation to the first justification, the chapeau’s discrim-
ination test applies only to discrimination between products originating in countries
where the “same conditions” prevail. As it is a measure’s objective that determines when
the “same conditions” do not prevail, the measure’s objective is capable of permitting the
measure’s disparate effects—in effect, justifying those effects. The second justification is
relevant only when the preceding analysis does not apply—that is, when the “same con-
ditions” do prevail, as determined by the objective. In these circumstances it is necessary
to consider whether the measure’s disparate effects constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.” Since the precondition for this question is that the measure’s objective
does not justify its disparate effects (or else, the “same conditions” would not prevail), it
follows that this second justification must be based on a rationale that is independent of
the measure’s objective. The conclusion is that, as a matter of legal logic, it cannot be a
requirement that the rationale for the discrimination and the objective of the measure be
rationally connected. Moreover, when the rationale for the discrimination is due to an
exception to a rule, as in EC—Seal Products, it will inmany cases even contradict the objec-
tive of the measure.
In relation to the much overlooked chapeau condition prohibiting measure constituting a
“disguised restriction on international trade,” this article has argued that this condition has
nothing to do with restrictions “disguised” by nonpublication, as some have thought, but
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rather that it refers to measures for which an improper purpose is “disguised” by an ostensibly
legitimate purpose.Given the prevalence ofmixed purposes in the adoption of trade-restrictive
measures, an important question will be whether this condition is interpreted as prohibiting
measures that are adopted even in part for an improper purpose or only measures that are
adopted substantially for an improper purpose. A measure that is adopted entirely for an
improper purpose would not survive scrutiny under the subparagraphs in the first place.
More work remains to be done, but it is hoped that this article provides at least a first step
toward recognizing the chapeau of the general exceptions as an important and sensible part of
the WTO legal framework.
THE EXPULSION OF ALIENS (REVISITED) ANDOTHER TOPICS:
THE SIXTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWCOMMISSION
By Sean D. Murphy*
The International Law Commission held its sixty-sixth session in Geneva from May 5 to
June 6, and from July 7 to August 8, 2014, under the chairmanship of Kirill Gevorgian (Rus-
sian Federation).1 Notably, the Commission revisited on second reading its work concerning
the expulsion of aliens so as to finalize thirty-one draft articles, along with commentaries. The
general thrust of this project has been to acknowledge the sovereign right of a state to expel an
alien from its territory and to identify or propose rules—protective of the rights of the alien—
that the state must follow when doing so.
Additionally, theCommission adopted onfirst reading twenty-one draft articles, alongwith
commentaries, relating to the protectionof persons in the event of disasters.These draft articles
address the rights and obligations of states affected by natural or man-made disasters, as well
as the rights and obligations of states and international organizations that provide assistance
to an affected state.Moreover, theCommissionfinalized itswork on the topic of the obligation
to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare).
Work continued on other topics on the Commission’s agenda: subsequent agreements and
subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties; protection of the atmosphere;
immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction; identification of customary
international law; protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts; provisional
application of treaties; and the most-favored-nation clause. A new topic of crimes against
humanity was added to the agenda, while another new topic on jus cogens was placed on the
long-term work program.
* Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington University, and member of the UN
InternationalLawCommission.My thanks to JenniferBabaie ( JD/MA ’15),GwendelynnBills ( JD ’15), andLaura
Withers ( JD ’16) for assistance in preparing this essay.
1 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, UN GAOR, 69th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 2, para. 3, UN Doc. A/69/10 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Report]. Most UN documents are
available online at http://documents.un.org/simple.asp.
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